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The end of the Cold War has had important repercussions upon the traditionalroles of the militaries in many Western and non-Western countries. This
changing international environment with the start of new times, where post-
modern militaries have emerged, has also led to a major revision of civil-mili-
tary relations (CMR) theories. The collapse of communism and the bipolar
world have paved the way for new times in which the armed forces face seri-
ous challenges amid the fundamental changes in the international context in
which they operate and in the social structure of the societies in which they are
embedded.1 Some theorists, such as Moskos, Williams, and Segal, argue that the
militaries of these new times—which are prevalent mostly in the Western coun-
tries—can be labeled “postmodern militaries” since their threat perceptions and
missions have changed to a great extent.2
Post-Cold War CMR theories not only aim to explain the impact of the
international context upon the militaries of the West, but they also deal with
the new context in which many non-Western countries are embedded. Unlike
the previous emphasis on military coup d’états or praetorianism, these theories
mostly point to the need for more democratic control of armed forces within
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the larger framework of democratization. Most of the countries that are the sub-
jects of these theories are the new democracies of the former communist Central
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, who face a serious challenge regarding
their roles in the new domestic and international political and strategic envi-
ronment.3 More specifically, the military profession in these countries is faced
with the problem of maintaining military effectiveness while responding to
“democratization.”4 Most recently, Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, with a focus
on the CEE postcommunist regimes, have pointed out “the necessity of recon-
ceptualizing civil-military relations in terms of democratic governance of the
defense and security sector and the democratic legitimacy, governance and
accountability of a state’s civil-military relationship.”5 They refer to this as the
second-generation problematic.
Some recent CMR theories deal with outside triggers that play an important
role in democratizing civil-military relations in these countries. These theories
point to the importance of a number of transnational institutional structures that
have been established with the specific aim (among others) of encouraging the
democratization of civil-military relations.6 They further argue that the combi-
nation of transnational norms and institutions, backed up by political condi-
tionality, create strong pressures for the CEE countries to democratize their
civil-military relations. The applications of the CEE countries in the 1990s for
membership in the European Union (EU), their accession in May 2004, and their
inclusion within the enlarged North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), rein-
forced the importance of the consolidation of democracy and encouraged the
political and military leaders in these countries to adapt to the standards of the
Western democracies, since the existence of a smoothly functioning democ-
racy is a sine qua non for membership as set forth at the Copenhagen European
Council in 1993. NATO and the EU are institutions through which the West
has been using conditionality to encourage the democratization of CMR in cen-
tral and eastern Europe, and more specifically the “democratic control of the
armed forces.”7
Although the CEE countries are examined in depth by CMR theories, there
is neglect in the case of Turkey, which has a rather controversial position regard-
ing this matter. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, and therefore
NATO membership has not been a precondition for democratic control of its
armed forces. Instead, Turkey’s long struggle to become a member of the EU
in accordance with its modernization and westernization program has acted as
an important outside trigger for democratization. Turkey had signed an Associ-
ation Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963,
much earlier than the CEE countries. However, as of yet, it has not been given
a date for the start of negotiations for EU membership due to the non-fulfil-
ment of the “political chapter” of Copenhagen criteria. One of the most impor-
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tant conditions among the political criteria has been the democratic control of
the military in Turkey.
This study is a single-case design that aims to test the CMR theories
regarding the impact of transnational factors upon democratic control of the
military by examining the Turkish case. The authors will test this theory by
looking at the evolution of the traditional guardianship role of the Turkish mil-
itary and its institutional reflections in the light of the conditions put forward by
its EU candidacy.
Armed Guardians of Turkish Democracy
As one of the key countries that had felt the impact of the Cold War due to
its geographic and geostrategic location, Turkey was an extremely important
component of Western strategy toward the Soviet Union. As the only secular
and democratic country having a 99 percent Muslim population, the Western
world viewed Turkey as a bulwark against the communist threat and as an
important asset against Islamic fundamentalism that could emanate from the
Middle East and Asia. Therefore, Cold War developments between the com-
munist and capitalist blocs had important implications for domestic politics in
Turkey, with the Turkish military playing an important role in this context. Like-
wise, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the bipolar character of
world politics forced the Turkish military to redefine its relations with the civil-
ian elite and also to deal with the challenges to its traditional guardianship role
that emanated from Turkey’s increasing interest and strong determination to
become a member of the EU.
The Turkish military, composed of approximately 800,0008 personnel, is
the most prominent security structure in Turkey. It has frequently been the
object of major criticisms from the EU regarding the lack of democratic con-
trol over the institution. Due to its recent direct interventions in politics (1960,
1971, 1980) and its indirect intervention in 1997, the Turkish military has been
classified among the “political armies” of the world.9 In addition, the “auto-
nomous”10 role played by the military in Turkish political life is regarded as a
major impediment to democratic consolidation; Turkish officers’ attempts to
bolster their autonomy from civilian governments with the argument that they
have always had a special relationship with the people—and thus a power base
of their own—do not exactly conform to the model of civil-military relations
in a liberal democracy.11
The autonomous role of the Turkish military in the politics of the country
can best be understood by inspecting its past and the historical heritage that
forms the backbone of its ideology. As described below, three important his-
torical legacies have had an impact upon the construction of a guardianship
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role12 (i.e., the protection of the Turkish Republic from any Islamist or separatist
threats).
1. The Ottoman legacy, against which the military developed a mentality
of modernization and Westernization, and a Young Turk tradition from
which military activism in politics is inherited.13
2. The legacy of the Turkish War of Independence, which legitimized the
Turkish military in the eyes of the Turkish people.14
3. The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology that
furnished the military with principles of secularism, democratic order,
and integrity of the republic.15
These three factors are not sufficient by themselves to explain the present
role of the military in Turkish politics. Equally important is the existence of
“triggering” factors,16 those changing strategic, political, social, and economic
dynamics within the domestic and external context. It is important to note that
changes in threat perceptions are extremely important in determining the context
of civil-military relations and the degree to which democratic control can be
exerted over the military. However, political leaders have failed to coordinate
their activites and impose civilian supremacy over the military institution.17
According to one scholar,
[C]ultural and institutional factors offer a clear explanation of civil-
military relations in Turkey. Despite their formal separation, military
and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect
concordance among the military, political elites and the citizenry. This
ruling style is the product of Turkey’s specific cultural, social and insti-
tutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as
well as historic conflicts with neighbouring states. Such conditions sig-
nificantly influence the military’s role in the nation.18
It is also important to consider the importance of the Kemalist heritage
which forms the foundation of the mentality of the Turkish armed forces. A def-
inition of Kemalism is as follows:
Kemalism is the set of realistic ideas and principles concerning the
state, the economy, intellectual life, and the fundamental social insti-
tutions. The basic principles were also laid down by Ataturk to ensure
the full independence, peace and welfare of the Turkish nation in the
present and the future, to ensure the sovereignty of the nation as the
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basis of the state, and to raise Turkish culture to the level of modern
civilization under the guidance of rational and scientific principles...
The adoption of Atatürkism on an individual and nation-wide basis and
its protection against current and prospective movements of a deviant
and conservative nature serve as the guarantee for the development,
strength and enlightened future of the Turkish state.19
For the officers, modernization meant Westernization and an important
component of Westernization was democracy. Their definition of democracy
can be likened to Giovanni Sartori’s “rational democracy”; that is, understand-
ing democracy as an intelligent debate among the educated for the purpose of
deciding upon the best policy option.20 In this respect, the military’s definition
is much closer to the maintenance of order than democracy per se. The Turkish
military argues that it accepts the legitimacy and supremacy of democratic ideals
and civilian rule, and defends the ideals of the democratic and secular charac-
ter and integrity of the Turkish Republic, due to the strong Kemalist legacy that
it inherited. The military upholds Kemalist values; when civilian regimes are
perceived as deviating from these values, the military has intervened to “put
things in order.”
The recent role of the military in Turkish politics is also due to the lack of
a strong democratic tradition, which reveals itself in the functioning of various
agents in Turkish democratic and political life. Petty party politics, the high
level of corruption among the civilians, and their inability to solve political and
economic crises have left room for the military to enter politics, fill the “vac-
uum,”21 and act as the guardians of the Republic. Thus, the negative image of
politicians is a source of differences between the military and the civilian
worlds. The majority of the cadets interviewed at the military schools and acad-
emies view a politician as someone who puts his personal interests or his party’s
interests before those of the nation.22
Finally, the role played by the military in Turkish political life is closely
related to the internal threats that are perceived as endangering the democratic
and secular character of the Republic as well as its integrity and its unitary struc-
ture. In this respect, the reemergence of the Kurdish problem in the 1980s, and
the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the 1990s, were important factors that
indirectly pushed the military to enter Turkish politics once again—although the
modes of intervention have changed over time.
The Problem of Democratic Control over the Turkish Military
The major criticisms directed by the EU at the Turkish military concern
mostly the institutional aspects of democratic control. In this respect, the status
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of the chief of the general staff under the prime minister (instead of the Min-
istry of National Defense), the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in
Turkish political life, and the lack of an effective civilian or parliamentary con-
trol over the military budget are the issues related to civilian oversight.23
Problem of Accountability
A serious criticism directed at the Turkish military concerns the status of
the chief of the general staff under the prime minister. This special status has
its roots in the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the years that
followed under single-party rule (1923–1946). The first step in establishing
civilian control over the military was realized on May 30, 1949, with a law
which subordinated the chief of general staff to the Ministry of Defense. This
step was part of the process of transition to multiparty democracy started in
1946, and it aimed to regulate civil-military relations as in Western democracies.
The military cadres were by no means opposed to this move, since the project
was begun by the “Second Man” of the Kemalist Republic, İsmet  İnönü.24
According to the 1961 Constitution, which was enacted after the coup d’état
on May 27, 1960, the chief of the general staff was defined as the commander of
the armed forces and therefore was made responsible to the prime minister. As
a consequence of this duality, the Constitutional Court found the law determin-
ing the status of the chief of the general staff incompatible with the 1961 Con-
stitution. Following amendments in 1970, two laws were passed; according to
these laws, “the Chief of the General Staff would determine the priorities and
principles and main programs concerning personnel, intelligence, mobiliza-
tion, education, and logistics.” It was also stated that, “in determination of the
military aspects and implementation of international agreements, the Chief of
the General Staff would be consulted. It may participate in those meetings if it is
deemed necessary.”25 For this reason, Turkey is still represented in organiza-
tions such as NATO by personnel at the level of the chief of the general staff.
The Ministry of National Defense, on the other hand, is responsible for the polit-
ical, legal, social, financial, and budgetary services for national defense in the
framework of the defense policy of the armed forces. The defense policy, in
turn, is agreed upon by the Council of Ministers according to the principles,
priorities, and major programs as determined by the chief of the general staff.
It was only during the government of Turgut Özal in the late 1980s that
the government made a show of strength in establishing political authority over
the military. The role of the armed forces in Turkish society, and within the gov-
ernmental structure of the Republic, was debated openly. This debate revolved
around the notion that the armed forces were protectors of democracy on the one
hand, and on the other hand that “praetorian guardianship could only impede the
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development of civil-societal institutions essential for obtaining a functioning
democratic system. Consequently, this would leave the military outside of any
supervision, which might lead democracy to experience serious bottlenecks in
the future.”26 The taboos regarding civilian involvement in matters related to the
internal organization and funding requirements of the military, including the
defense budget, were also broken by the Özal administration. In 1987, Özal
started to review the defense budget and initiated public discussion of the
resource requirements for the professionalization of the military as a whole. A
few months later, Özal declared his intention to make the chief of the general
staff report to the defense minister if his government obtained a sufficient major-
ity of the seats in parliament after the elections. His plan was not implemented
because his party gained less than a two-thirds majority of votes in the parlia-
mentary elections—the minimum number of votes required to make constitu-
tional amendments. Moreover, these attempts by Özal had not found any rele-
vant support from fellow party leaders and the people.27
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense assumed greater authority over
defense requirements during Özal’s regime, and the military budget was openly
discussed. According to one scholar, it was probably no coincidence that a pub-
lic relations department was formed in the Office of the General Staff soon after
these issues came under public scrutiny.28 At present, the military still insists on
the necessity of the chief of the general staff reporting directly to the prime min-
ister instead of the minister of national defense. The main reason behind this
insistence is the desire to prevent the politicization of the military (as had
occurred in the 1950s). The military contends that if it were subordinate to the
minister of defense, a chief of general staff might easily be replaced depending
on political preferences. Moreover, it is also possible that some regime oppo-
nents may come to power through democratic process. In that case, an opponent
cannot be allowed to shape the Turkish armed forces according to their own
understanding.29
The National Security Council
The NSC is another “undemocratic” mechanism that has been criticized in
the yearly regular reports of the European Commission because of a lack of
effective democratic control over it. The NSC is defined in the Constitution as
a constitutional consultative organ chaired by the president, and includes the fol-
lowing members: the prime minister, chief of the general staff, minister of
national defense, minister of interior affairs, minister of foreign affairs, com-
mander of land forces, commander of naval forces, commander of air forces,
and general commander of gendarmerie. Other ministers and officials may be
invited to the meetings to share their opinions depending on the nature of the
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agenda. The decisions of the NSC are formulated in line with the definition of
the concept of national security. Therefore, this concept of national security is
crucial to assess the role played by the NSC in Turkish political life. The Act
of the National Security Council and National Security Council General Secre-
tariat dated December 9, 1983 (No. 2945) defines national security as the “pro-
tection and maintenance of the state’s constitutional order, national presence,
integrity, its political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international
level and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat.”30 In
this context, the NSC’s agenda includes any matter that is perceived as rele-
vant to national security. The NSC advises the Council of Ministers of its views
on the determination and implementation of national security policy as well as
required coordination. The decisions made by the NSC have to be given priority
for evaluation by the cabinet.
During the 1990s, Turkey’s determination to become a member of the EU
reached its height. The Turkish military supported this move since it was per-
ceived to be in line with the Kemalist ideology that praised Westernization and
modernization. However, the 1990s were also the years in which the military had
to work through the NSC to fufill its traditional role of guardian of the Turkish
Republic against two major axes of conflict: the rise of political Islam accompa-
nied by an increasing number of reactionary Islamic activities, and the prolonged
conflict in southeastern Anatolia between the Partita Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK,
the Kurdish Workers’ Party) and the Turkish military. On April 29, 1997, the
military’s “new wars” were defined by the Turkish chief of the general staff, who
announced a radical change in the national military defense concept embodied
in the National Security Policy Document (NSPD): priority would be given to
combating internal threats from Islamic activism and Kurdish separatism, rather
than safeguarding the state against interstate wars and external threats.
On October 31, 1997, the NSC accepted the NSPD, which included a list
of measures that had been prepared by the NSC and submitted to the Council
of Ministers, and which laid down the principles that the NSC considered vital.
In summary, the redefined principles stated in part that separatist and reactionary
activities were equally important threats to the Republic which should be given
priority, and that political Islam continued to be a threat. These changes in focus
were signals that the NSC would play a larger role in the near future.
The Military, Political Islam, and the “Postmodern Coup”
The political role played by the NSC first attracted attention following deci-
sions made on February 28, 1997 to counter the increasing reactionary activities
of political Islam which were believed to threaten the secular and democratic
pillars of the established order.31 The military wing of the NSC voiced its dis-
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content with this situation. The main target of their harsh complaints was the
coalition government, led by the religiously oriented Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare
Party). The party was known for its religious rhetoric; when this rhetoric was
put into practice, the military was alarmed. Some of the RPs practices included
the adoption of Ramadan (the holy month of fasting in Islam) hours in govern-
mental organizations, increasing the financial strength of religious entities, and
increasing the number and activities of religious orders as well as prayer leader
and preacher schools. The military’s unease was exacerbated by additional fac-
tors such as the foreign policy of the coalition government and the public remarks
of some Welfare Party deputies attacking Kemalist secular and democratic prin-
ciples. For instance, on April 13, 1994, Prime Minister Erbakan asked Refah’s
representatives in the parliament to consider whether the change in the social
order that the party sought would be “peaceful or violent,” and would be achieved
“harmoniously or by bloodshed.”32 On March 23, 1993, in a speech to the
National Assembly, Erbakan advocated the “plurality of legal systems” and
stated: “We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several legal systems.
The citizens must be able to choose for himself which legal system is the most
appropriate for him, within a framework of general principles.”33 Şevki Yılmaz,
a Refah deputy, said in public speeches in 1994: “Our mission is not to talk but to
implement the war plan as a soldier in the army34 ... The question Allah will ask
you is this: ‘Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for
the construction of an Islamic State?’ Erbakan and his friends want to bring Islam
to this country in the form of a political party.”35 Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, another
Refah member of parliament, stated publicly on March 14, 1993, “Our homeland
belongs to us, but not the regime, dear brothers... The regime and Kemalism
belong to others. Turkey will be destroyed, gentlemen.”36 İbrahim Halil Çelik,
a Refah leader, exclaimed in Parliament:
If you try to close the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools while Refah
is in government, blood will flow. It will be worse than in Algeria. I too
would like blood to flow. That’s how democracy will be installed in
this country... The army has not been able to deal with the 3,500 mem-
bers of the PKK. How will it deal with six million Islamists? If they
[the army] piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet ... I will fight
to the end to introduce the Sharia.37
The mayor of the city of Kayseri, Şükrü Karatepe, stated in the party meeting
after the Memorial Day of Atatürk ceremony on November 10, 1996:
Don’t think I am a supporter of secularism. I have to attend these cer-
emonies in spite of myself... This system must change. We have
Güney and Karatekelioǧlu 447
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waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in
store for us. And let Muslims keep alive their resentment, rancour, and
hatred that they feel in their hearts.38
Last but not least, Prime Minister Erbakan received religious leaders at his offi-
cial residence, an act that was perceived by the military as an assurance of his
support for them.39 The meeting with these leaders (who were wearing religious
attire forbidden by the Dress Code), together with the above-mentioned public
statements, were perceived as official recognition of these religious orders by
the state. For the military, such actions were seen as undermining the secularist
pillar of the Turkish Republic.
Despite these alarming developments, the military did not opt for direct
intervention as in the past. Instead of assuming power, it chose to voice its dis-
content at the NSC. The decisions of February 28, 1997, were perceived as an
ultimatum by the civilian government, and this “indirect intervention” in Turk-
ish politics was regarded as a “silent coup d’état” or a “post-modern coup.”40
The crisis was solved by the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan.
The main reason why the military was perceived as intervening in politics
was not simply the decisions of February 28, 1997, but also the insistence by the
military NSC members on controlling whether these decisions were imple-
mented. Other reasons included the briefings given to various civil society orga-
nizations by the chief of the general staff informing them about the nature of
the Islamic threat, and also the declarations and statements of the military. In
sum, the February 28 decisions resembled the “coup by communiqué” of 1971.
Some commentators also argue that the Batı Çalışma Grubu (BÇG, Western
Study Group) that was formed by commanders in the general staff headquar-
ters was a sign that the military was acting on its own without consulting any
civilian authority.41
The year-long (1996–1997) coalition government, which included repre-
sentatives from Refah Partisi and Doǧru Yol Partisi (DYP, the True Path Party),
was quite significant in assessing the role of the military in the NSC. It is ironic
to note that when the democratic regime faced the threat of political Islam,
expressed in such a way as to infringe upon the untouchable principles of the
Republic, democratic control of the military was not even questioned. On the
contrary, the military had quite strong support from many segments of soci-
ety (e.g., some media and civil society organizations that had been critical of
the military’s role in previous interventions). This time, the military’s role
was seen as legitimate by the populace. Ironically, the military was perceived as
the only institution that could safeguard the democratic regime and the consti-
tutional order without resorting to arms. The military regarded its new mission
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as twofold, as explained by Commander of the Navy Güven Erkaya, in a later
interview:
First, to help the people realize this threat and second to mobilise the
civilians against this threat. In other words, this “coup” should be made
by the civilians ... the military never wanted to make a coup d’état. The
Turkish Armed Forces evaluated the possibility of a reactionary threat
sliding to the street, and thus took measures. That is all that has been
done. We thought, if some people want to make Turkey an Iran and
desire to bring a theocratic regime instead of democracy, we should
first try to deter them by “rhetoric.” This has been done. This has been
told to them in legitimate platforms [as] in the NSC meeting face to
face. This was a test, a democracy test. Turkey passed this test. Now,
even if a similar thing happens in the future, Turkey has this experi-
ence. The experience of overcoming a reactionary threat in the Parlia-
ment is a great experience. It is an important experience.42
Indeed, according to the military, the intervention on February 28 was a
“democratic reaction,” and the armed forces acted like any other civil society orga-
nization against the perceived Islamic threat.43 The concept of democratic reaction
denotes that the religiously led coalition government was pressured to resign for
the sake of preserving the secular and democratic principles of the Republic, upon
which the government’s Islamist policies and activities were infringing.
The Turkish Military, the Kurdish Problem, and the EU
The Kurdish separatist movement was another important factor that led to a
political role for the Turkish military in the 1980s and 1990s. The direct involve-
ment of the armed forces in a sort of guerilla warfare with the PKK since 1984
was a matter of critical debate (especially in the European countries) regarding
the Turkish army’s role in national politics. The struggle was perceived by many
Western democracies, as well as the EU, as a war against the Kurdish population
in southeastern Anatolia, who wanted to establish their own state.
However, the military’s internal security role in combating the PKK had a
legal basis. The struggle was carried out entirely under the command and man-
agement of the legal civilian authority. A State of Emergency Regional Gover-
norship and a Public Order Command of Gendarmerie were established by
decree (under Act No. 285) to make the struggle against terrorism more effec-
tive, and those efforts took place under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry
in line with the State of Emergency Act 2985. According to this latter Act, when
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a state of emergency is in effect, the regional governor may employ military
forces to combat terrorism if necessary.
The physical defeat of PKK occured after the head of the terrorist organi-
zation, Abdullah Öcalan, was finally arrested. The move by the military—
which threatened to declare war against Syria unless it stopped providing the
terrorist chief with accommodation—was a decisive step. The result was the
expulsion of Öcalan from Syria. Öcalan was finally arrested in Kenya in 1998
and returned to Turkey, along with the other heads of the terrorist organiza-
tion. Since then the terrorist activities have been under control. However, the
military was not outspoken regarding the death sentence later passed on Öcalan;
they stated that “it is first the judiciary and then the Parliament who would
decide the issue according to the Constitution.”44 The arrest of Öcalan increased
the credibility of the army in the eyes of the Turkish public. An opinion poll
revealed that the army was credited as having the primary role in the success-
ful arrest of Öcalan.45
After the arrest of Öcalan in 1998, the decreasing intensity of the armed
conflict in southeast Anatolia allowed the military to review its mission there
and prompted discussion of the legal arrangements that would be needed to
grant rights (such as education, broadcasting, etc.) to the Kurdish citizens of
Turkey. Since these legal amendments constitute a part of the political criteria
that Turkey has to fulfill in order to become a member of the EU, attention
focused on the military’s possible reaction to such amendments. While the mil-
itary stated that it genuinely supported Turkey’s EU membership, they remained
sensitive about certain issues.
In the context of the National Security Document chapter on “Protecting
Minority Rights,” the NSC argued that recognition of Kurdish identity or per-
mission to operate Kurdish-language television channels would fuel separatism
and damage Turkish national unity. In addition, the NSC declared that the
authority to restrict human rights should be given to the state in case of emer-
gency, while at the same time allowing Turkey to harmonize with the Copen-
hagen criteria on other issues.46
The EU and the Turkish Military
The method used to accomplish the indirect coup of 1997 was chosen pri-
marily to protect Turkey’s prestige in the eyes of the EU, which Turkey was
aspiring to join. The military expressed its view of the issue in the National
Strategy Document, stating that “the objective of Turkey’s full membership of
the EU should be maintained, yet the negative attitudes of some member states
should not be disregarded.”47 This concern was also voiced by some senior gen-
erals, who openly criticized the preference of some European member states as
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a “visionless” strategy that tended to exclude Turkey from the new map of
Europe.48 The generals also claimed that the new political and security archi-
tecture being forged would fail to secure a stable environment for Europe in
the long term: it was creating artificial borders in Europe; seemed unable to con-
tribute to European unity; and would not help in any way to transform the
Balkans, the Mediterranean (particularly the eastern Mediterranean), the Black
Sea, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation into safe and
stable regions.49 Coming just before the Luxembourg European Council meet-
ing in December 1997, such statements by high-ranking generals revealed that
they very much “resented the attitude of Europe, and criticized the EU for keep-
ing Turkey outside and adopting an attitude that almost ignored and even com-
plicated Turkey’s legitimate security requirements.”50
The EU’s criticisms of Turkey with respect to democratic control of the
military and the political role of the NSC were mentioned in the 1998 Progress
Report on Turkey prepared by the Commission of the European Union. In that
report, the military’s political role was regarded as a major obstacle to the con-
solidation of Turkish democracy. Although there was no direct reference to spe-
cific issues (e.g., political Islam or the Kurdish problem), EU criticism of the
NSC’s role was quite strong.
The Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards
Accession, dated October 13, 1999, stated that
[T]hrough the National Security Council, the military continues to
have an important influence in many areas of political life... The
National Security Council continues to play a major role in political
life. While the emergency courts system remains in place, the replace-
ment of the military judge by a civilian one in the State Security
Courts, represents a clear improvement in terms of the independence of
the judiciary.51
The problems of democratic control of the military also gained prominence
after the Helsinki European Council held on December 10–11, 1999. That
assembly produced a breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations with the announce-
ment of Turkey’s candidacy status. The Presidency Conclusions of the European
Council stated that:
Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the
same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. Building on the
existing European Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate states, will ben-
efit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.
This would include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on
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progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with
particular reference to the issue of human rights.52
The military reacted positively, and stated that they gave full support to
the EU decision in this respect. However, as mentioned above, the developing
relations between Turkey and the EU had some important repercussions upon
the guardianship role of the military. At every opportunity, the EU voiced its
uneasiness with the army’s powerful role in Turkish politics and criticized the
NSC for being an undemocratic institution. The autonomous role of the NSC
constituted a problem for Turkey in meeting the political requisites of mem-
bership described in the Copenhagen criteria, and was even regarded as an
“obstacle” to full membership of Turkey in the EU.53 The Progress Report on
Turkey for 2001 restated the EU’s worries about the NSC’s role in Turkish pol-
itics. The report stated that there had been no change in the role of the NSC,
and that it seemed that the NSC’s presence put serious limitations upon the func-
tioning of the government. In addition, the report reiterated that it seemed “there
is a great lack of parliamentary control over the issues related to defense and
security,” and therefore proposed that Turkey increase the number of civilians
on the NSC from five to eight. The military’s response to this proposal was
again quite positive; the chief of general staff stated that “the number of the
civilians can even be increased to 100. It does not matter. The NSC takes deci-
sions by consensus under the chairmanship of the President, not by lifting fin-
gers.”54 In response to this EU proposal, representatives of the Human Rights
Coordinating High Council, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Justice,
together with the vice prime ministers, are now present at NSC meetings.
Another EU criticism concerned the status of the Office of the Chief of the
General Staff. The chief of the general staff is appointed by the president, and
is responsible to the prime minister. The EU’s argument is that in developed
democratic regimes, the chief of the general staff should be responsible to the
Ministry of Defense, and this should be the case in Turkey. However (as
explained above), the Turkish military opposes this proposal, stating that the
present arrangement is due to the sui generis status of the military in Turkey.
Despite its firm official commitment to maintain the integrity, secularity,
and democratic character of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish military clearly
seems aware of the need to modify its strategies and policies to interact more
with civilians, to be as transparent as possible, and not to impede democratic
consolidation in Turkey. One example of such initiative is the preparations for
the “brainstorming” or “brown-bag” meetings of the chief of the general staff
and the press. The aim of these meetings was “to avoid incomplete and mis-
information for the people inside and outside Turkey on important issues con-
cerning Turkey.”55 Moreover, in line with its strong determination and support
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for Turkey’s EU orientation, the Office of the Chief of General Staff established
an EU Working Group in early 2000 to plan the military’s actions during the
harmonization process with the EU. Similar working groups were also estab-
lished within the headquaters of the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force with the
same objective.56
The Regular Report of the EU Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards
Accession, dated November 8, 2000, stated that:
[T]here has been no change in the role played by the National Secu-
rity Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements and
recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process,
as witnessed in the recent debate over the dismissing of civil servants
suspected of links with radical Islamic and separatist movements. In
addition, it appears that at present the views of the National Security
Council in practice seriously limit the role played by the government.
Moreover there seems to be too little accountability to the Parliament
with regard to defence and security matters. It is noted that the possi-
bility of increasing the number of civilian members of the National
Security Council is currently under debate within political and military
circles.57
It was only after the preparation and submission of the National Program
that the Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards
Accession (dated November 13, 2001) stated that, “as part of the constitutional
reform package, the provision of Article 118 concerning the role and composi-
tion of the National Security Council has been amended. The number of civilian
members of the NSC has been increased from five to nine while the number of
the military representatives remains at five.” In addition, the new text put
emphasis on the nature of this body, stressing that its role would be limited to
recommendations. The government would now be required to simply evaluate
the NSC’s recommendations instead of giving them priority consideration.
However, the report also stated that the extent to which the constitutional
amendment would enhance de facto civilian control over the military would
need to be monitored. Since the last Regular Report was prepared, the NSC has
given its opinion on a number of governmental issues and policies, including the
Cyprus issue, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), measures to
combat antisecular activism, extension of the compulsory age limit in primary
education, the state of emergency in various provinces, the privatization of
state companies (e.g., Telecom), recent socioeconomic developments, and the
constitutional reform package. The NSC has also warned against the risk of
social unrest.
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It is interesting to note that the reactions of the Turkish military toward
EU policies have been affected to a great extent by critical statements made by
EU leaders. One of the foremost topics that has shaped the military’s attitude is
the issue of ESDP. In December 2002, EU leaders at the Laeken Summit
decided to announce that the Political and Security Committee as well as the
Military Committee—both core institutions of the European Army—would
become operational. This decision meant that the EU would have the authority
and ability to launch humanitarian interventions in low-intensity crisis situations
without seeking NATO’s assets and capabilities.
In the London talks between the United States, Turkey, and Britain, Turkey
raised several points that it deemed critical to its own interests. They included
a request to participate in the ESDP military secretariat on a permanent basis
with a military representative. This request was not accepted by EU officials.
The Turkish authorities also pointed out that:
[I]n the case of autonomous EU operations that do not require NATO
assets, once Turkey states that the operation lies within geographic
proximity to its territory or affects its vital interests, the EU must assure
Turkey of participation in the decision-making process and the opera-
tion. Turkey sought an automatic invitation to be made by the ESDP
for the operations to be staged in Turkey’s proximity such as the
Balkans where Turkey does not have any bilateral dispute but has a
close interest.58
The EU acted reluctantly in giving Turkey such assurances, and this caused
resentment on the part of the Turkish military—who had assessed the issue on
the basis of national security. Turkish War Academies Commander Nahit
Şenoǧul stated that:
[T]he fact that the EU has ignored the decisions taken at the Washing-
ton Summit in its Nice Summit and decided to exclude Turkey from the
ESDP and to postpone its membership to post-2010 is seen as an unfair
and disloyal EU attitude towards Turkey and causes the feeling of
being deceived to arise on the part of Turkey.”59
The future implications of being left out of the ESDP, according to the
army, would be twofold: “the efficiency of NATO and transatlantic relations
will erode and the EU will engage in security operations in a manner that might
negatively affect Turkey’s security interests.”60
Another example of the Turkish military’s recent reactions to the EU is
revealed in the words of former Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoǧlu,
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who stated that “despite the fact that Turkey has its face turned to the West, in
Europe there is still a centuries-old feeling of ‘exclusion’ towards the Turks.”61
In another instance, he had stated that “according to new research published, the
Europeans do not consider the Serbs, the Albanians and the Turks as Europeans.
What we have to do is to change the perceptions of the Europeans towards
Turkey. We definitely have to correct our image there.”62
It has been clearly stated, at every opportunity, that the Turkish military
respects and supports Turkey’s European orientation. Yet the military have felt
the urge to warn against infringing upon the two “untouchable republican prin-
ciples” of secularism and unity. The following statement by Kıvrıkoǧlu is worth
noting in this respect:
The armed forces do not even discuss the issue of whether Turkey
should enter the EU or not. The membership of the EU will assure so
many benefits for Turkey. Turkey wants to increase its welfare, and
this could be done much more easily in the EU. Turkish people and
the bureaucracy will gain a discipline and dynamism and have to com-
ply with some rules. However, what we say is that the critical position
of Turkey, the geo-strategic position of Turkey that always creates
problems, should be taken into consideration as the membership efforts
are made. Do not ignore the secular character and unitary structure of
Turkey. These are the main principles of the Republic of Turkey.
Numerous freedoms will be available if Turkey becomes a member of
the EU. However, these should not violate democracy and human
rights.63
In the same vein, the 2002 revision of the 1997 National Security Docu-
ment culminated in a serious civil-military dispute. In a statement, Deputy
Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz criticized Turkey’s national security under-
standing and claimed that progress was being hampered by such a syndrome.64
The military reacted rather harshly, and stated that “it was not only unfortu-
nate but also dangerous to blame the national security concept for negative
developments in the country,” and that “national security should not be an issue
of political exploitation.”65
The EU Candidacy and Democratic Control in Turkey
A number of fundamental changes have been made to the legal framework
of the NSC with a view to aligning relations between civil and military author-
ities with the practices of EU member states. For instance, as stated in the 2003
Regular Report of the European Commission, “the advisory nature of the NSC
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was confirmed in a law implementing the amendment of October 2001 relating
to Article 118 of the Constitution, which also increased the number of civilians
in the NSC.” In addition, an amendment to the Law on the National Security
Council abrogated the provision that “the NSC will report to the Council of Min-
isters the views it has reached and its suggestions.”
The NSC representative to the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and
Music was removed by an amendment to the relevant law. However, an NSC
representative remains on other civilian boards, such as the Radyo Televizyon
Üst Kurulu (RTÜK, High Audio-Visual Board) and the Yüksek Öǧrenim Kurulu
(YÖK, Higher Education Board).
The seventh reform package adopted in July 2003 introduced some funda-
mental changes to the duties, functioning, and composition of the NSC with an
amendment to the Law on the National Security Council:
• The extended executive and supervisory powers of the Secretary Gen-
eral of the NSC. In particular, the provision empowering him to follow
up, on behalf of the President and the Prime Minister, the implementation
of any recommendation made by the NSC has been abrogated.
• Unlimited access of the NSC to any civilian agency has also been abrogated.
• The post of Secretary General will no longer be reserved exclusively for
a military person. The frequency of the NSC meetings has been modified,
so that it will meet every two months instead of once a month.
• The transparency of defense expenditures will be enhanced. The Court of
Auditors will now be authorized to audit accounts and transactions of all
types of organisations including state properties owned by the armed
forces. The audit of the Court is still subject to the restrictions under
Article 160 of the Constitution under which the confidentiality of national
defense is established.66
The 2003 Regular Report, on the other hand, states that “the Armed Forces
continue to enjoy a substantial degree of autonomy in preparing and establishing
the defense budget and in public procurement in the defense-related area.”67 The
report gives utmost importance to “the alignment of civilian control of the military
with practice in the EU member states, the withdrawal of military representation
from civilian bodies and full control of the Parliament on the defense budget.”68
The Future Prospects for More Democratic Control
As seen from the preceding analysis, the conditions that surround Turkey’s
EU candidacy have certainly contributed to a change in the weltanschauung of
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the Turkish military, since it is one of the key elements of the long-term guar-
antee of keeping the military in their barracks.69 Turkey’s EU candidacy and the
subsequent emphasis on increasing democracy will most probably continue to
impact the military and put more pressure on them to become more transparent
and accountable to the public. In this sense, we can argue that the EU candi-
dacy has enhanced the prospects for increased democratic civil-military rela-
tions in the future.
On the other hand, Turkey’s EU candidacy and its determination to fulfill the
political criteria to become a full member constitute an important challenge to the
military’s traditional role as guardian of the Republic. Although the Turkish
military is aware that staging a classical coup d’état has become quite difficult
due to domestic and international pressures, it still considers itself the guardian of
Kemalist principles and values, and thus insists on retaining a certain degree of
autonomy over its own affairs. The military’s adoption of a more subtle approach
to achieve its political objectives is evident in the postmodern coup of February
28, 1997. Faced with the threat of reactionary Islam, it did not stage a coup as in
the past, but instead exerted quite sophisticated political pressure and took mea-
sures via the NSC to deal with the perceived Islamic threat.
Although the military seems to be willing to limit its own power in some
areas and allow a degree of civilian control, as seen in the example of the reform
packages that amended the 1982 Constitution, there are certain spheres that the
military seems to consider vitally important for national interests. On these mat-
ters, at least for the foreseeable future, they will probably not change their stance.
One such issue is accountability of the chief of the general staff to the prime min-
ister. Despite pressure from the EU, the military insists that this arrangement is
a necessity that stems from the historical and strategic conditions unique to
Turkey.
It is also important to note that without sufficient knowledge of the qual-
ity, nature, and functioning of democracy in Turkey, it is not possible to pre-
dict the degree of democratic control over the military in the near future. Civil-
military relations in Turkey are determined, to a great extent, by the role played
by the civilians. The military has intervened mostly because of the weaknesses
of the Turkish political system and poor political leadership. This argument is
also voiced by one of the senior generals, who stated:
None of us are willing to take control of this country or to become
involved in politics. But while some bodies within the Turkish gov-
ernment are in a continuing state of ignorance and negligence, we have
no other option... This should not be seen as the Turkish military
becoming overly involved in Turkish politics or pressuring politicians.
Everybody should understand the Turkish military’s sensitivity on
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Turkey’s interests both at home and abroad. Of course, we respect the
Constitution and the laws by which we receive our responsibility and
power. We are always ready to cooperate with governments that are
working sincerely. But there are vital issues for us on which we can not
make any concession.70
As discussed by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, civilian politicians in some
CEEC countries have sometimes attempted to draw the military into politics in
order to gain the perceived advantage of being supported by or associated with
the armed forces.71 The same situation holds true in the Turkish case. For
instance, during the “indirect intervention” of 1997, one can observe that the
center-left parties (which also claimed to be representing the secular segments
of the society) were trying to persuade the military to take measures against the
rise of the reactionary activities of Islamists. In the absence of responsible civil-
ian elites and political parties, the military, ironically, remains and will continue
to remain the most credible institution, in the eyes of the Turkish people, to save
democracy when it falls under attack. Therefore, in Turkey the more imminent
threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism take precedence over the
democratic control of the Turkish military.
Conclusion
In conclusion, one can argue that EU candidacy has contributed to democ-
ratization of civil-military relations in Turkey. However, there are certain lim-
its to its impact, and this will probably remain the case n the foreseeable future.
Although the Turkish military will probably not attempt a direct coup d’état or
show tendencies toward praetorianism—behaviors which are labeled first gen-
eration problems by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster—the armed forces are not
ready to become a postmodern military yet, and the second generation problems
of democratic consolidation, effectiveness, and efficiency will continue to per-
sist in the near future. Only with the perceived disappearance of separatist ten-
dencies, a decreasing intensity of political Islam, and more civilian empower-
ment and responsibility can the prospects for more democratic control over the
military, and therefore a more consolidated democracy, be realized in Turkey.
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